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TOWARD A RATIONAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE
CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
In regulating corporate activity, courts and
legislatures have generally treated corporations
as though they were "natural persons,"' with a
life separate from those who run their daily
operations. This legal fiction has considerable
limitations, however, when one seeks to control
corporate behavior through the imposition of
criminal penalties. As a result, many courts
and legislatures have tried to make the regula-
tion of corporate behavior more effective by
creating criminal liability for both the corpora-
tion and the individual officers and executives
of the corporation.2
Not enough attention has been paid to deter-
mining the theoretical basis of this liability,
and many courts dealing with the issue have
dispensed with the traditional notions underly-
ing criminal liability. They have created a doc-
trine of vicarious liability, under which criminal
responsibility is determined solely on the basis
of the individual's relationship with the corpo-
rate offender.
In a series of decisions,3 the Supreme Court
has indicated that the criminal provisions of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Ac
could be applied to corporate officers on the
basis of their relationship with the corporate
offender without regard to intent or knowledge
on the part of the individual officer. In United
States v. Park,5 the Court followed these de-
cisions. Elements of the decision, however, sug-
gest a possible interpretation of the Act which
would be consistent with traditional principles
of criminal liability, but would still allow effec-
tive regulation of corporate activity. This com-
ment Will explore the traditional purposes be-
hind the imposition of criminal liability and the
relationship between the corporation and its
management and suggest a basis upon which
criminal liability can be imposed on corporate
'C. STONE. WHERE THE LAW ENDS 2 (1975).
-Lee, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 16-28 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Lee].
3 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v.
Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
4 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970).
5 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
executives without doing violence to the tradi-
tional purposes behind criminal liability.
The theoretical underpinnings of criminal
liability have consistently reflected two things:
the role of the individual in society and the
role of the criminal law in society. It is generally
agreed that the principle of vengeance was the
earliest source of criminal liability.6 In its earli-
est form, crime was not seen as a wrong against
the collective security of the state but was seen
as an injury to the "private peace of a family or
clan.17 The family, organized as a unit for
protection against outside aggression,' pos-
sessed the power to punish. Internally, wrongs
were punished by the head of the family.'
External wrongs were dealt with by a feud,
which was a "private war between the clan of
the offender and the offended." 0 The purpose
of these feuds was to restore the "dignity of
the offended clan.""
The clan or family of an individual was not
only placed in the role of avenger for a wrong
to individual members, it was also held respon-
sible when one of its members committed a
wrong. To the ancient mind, "conduct was not
an individual determination, it was a result of
group resoluifion."'12 The legal and social posi-
tion of the individual was thus determined by
his relationship to the clan, and the clan, rather
than the individual, was the responsible entity.
Gradually, as political institutions became
better developed, society developed a "con-
sciousness for communal peace and security." 3
6 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 39-40 (1881)
[hereinafter cited as HOLMES]; E. Binavince, The
Ethical Foundations of Criminal Liability, 33 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1, 2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Binavince];
Chesney, The Concept of Criminal Mens Rea in the
Criminal Law, 29 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 627 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as Chesney].




0Id.; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW *448 [hereinafter cited
as POLLOCK & MAITLAND]; Chesney, supra note 6, at
12-13.
1i Binavince,supra note 6, at 12-13.
1 Id. at 13.
1
3Id. at 3.
Vol. 69, No. I
Printed in U.S.A.
COMMENTS
Crimes came to be considered breaches of the
peace as well as a private wrong to the family
of the victim. The private law of vengeance
was gradually displaced by a system which
allowed the state to satisfy the desire for ven-
geance and to deal with the breach of the com-
munal peace. 4
Prior to the twelfth century, the law made
no distinction between the presence or absence
of a guilty mind.15 Liability was based originally
on the objective fact that an injury had been
done." The measure of causality was primitive,
and the relevant inquiry was whether one had
committed any act which had led to the injury.
According to Pollock and Maitland,"7 one was
considered to have slain a man "if but for some
act of [his] he might perhaps be yet alive."'1 7
"Id. at 3; Chesney, supra note 6, at 627, 643.
Shortly before the Norman Conquest, four methods
had been developed for dealing with the wrongdoer.
See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, upra note 10, at *447;
Binavince, 5upra note 6, at 4. The harshest penalty
was to declare the offender to be an outlaw, which
meant that the community had declared war on the
individual, and that every man had the right and
duty to "hunt him down like a wild beast and slay
him." POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at *447.
The second way of dealing with the wrongdoer was
to allow the families to exact retribution through the
blood feud. In order to avoid the blood feud, a third
alternative developed: payment by the offender, or
his family of the tariffs of wer, wite and bot. Bot was a
settlement with the injured person, determined by
reference to the amount of damage done. Wite was a
tariff made in settlement with the king. The wer, or
wergild, was a statutory sum paid to the family and to
the king to atone for the victim's death; the amount
paid was determined by the victim's rank. Id. at
*448-49; BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY at 231, 1776, 1766
(Rev. 4th ed. 1968). Finally, the law could inflict
corporal punishment on the offender. POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 10, at *447; Binavince, supra
note 6, at 4.
's Chesney, supra note 6, at 629
10 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at *468;
Binavince, supra note 6, at 4; Chesney, supra note 6,
at 627.
17 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at *468;
Binavince, supra note 6, at 5. Pollock and Maitland
illustrate the extent to which this view was held at
early law:
At your request I accompany you when you are
about your own affairs; my enemies fall upon
and kill me; you must pay for my death. You
take me to see a wild-beast-show or that interest-
ing spectacle a madman; beast or madman kills
me; you must pay.... In none of these cases
can you honestly swear that you (lid nothing
that ihelped to bring about death or wound.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at *469 (foot-
notes omittel). In fact, in nmore primitive laws, the
No attempt was made to distinguish between
crimes committed with or without intent.'6
The harshness of this doctrine gradually be-
came apparent to those administering the crim-
inal justice system, and doctrines such as self
defense and accidental injury began to develop.
By the thirteenth century, the king had begun
to grant pardons where it was evident that the
accused had acted in self defense. "But it is
important to notice that justification was not as
yet recognized; hence, the defendant needs a
pardon.""0 As the system of justice began to
take a more systematic consideration of of-
fenses,2 0 civil and criminal wrongs were con-
trasted. Great stress was placed on the "psychi-
cal elements of crime."2' The concept of com-
pensation became more prevalent in the devel-
oping law of torts. The courts began to distin-
guish between criminal and tort liability, argu-
ing that "in tort, unlike in crime, the 'intent' to
cause damage was immaterial.""
One of the most important influences in the
changing concept of criminal liability was the
Christian Church.2 3 The Church placed great
stress on the mental elements of sin.2 4 Professor
Binavince explained the theoretical underpin-
nings of this concept:
The point of departure of the Christian religion
was the existence of a creative element in the
human mind. Sin evaluates the purposive func-
tioning of this element; it is therefore a moral
concept definable in reference to the activity of
the relevant mental state. The sanctions follow-
ing sin assume a personal moral responsibility
over human conduct. These were embodied in
the ecclesiastical laws and poenitentiaries of the
church, and the legal minds from Henry l's
reign found them ready sources of guidance in
the development of criminal law.2
man himself did not have to commit the act, since he
was responsible for injury caused by his possessions
or slaves. Id. at *470.
11 "'The thought of man shall not be tried, for the
devil himself knoweth not the thought of man':-
thus at the end of the middle ages spoke Brian C. J.
in words that might well be the motto for the early
history of criminal law." Id. at *473.
19 Binavince, supra note 6, at 7.
20 Id. at 14.
' POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at *475.
22 Binavince, supra note 6, at 9.
21 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at *475-
76; Binavince, supra note 6, at 14-15; Chesney, supra
note 6, at 629.
24 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 10, at *474.
2 Binavince, supra note 6, at 15.
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Other factors influencing the development of
the concept of individual responsibility were
the general weakening of family ties and the
growing number of foreigners without any
family.26 Both placed a great strain on a system
ofjustice based on family responsibility.
Over time the individual was perceived as
personally responsible for his own conduct, an
idea in sharp contrast to the earlier law's em-
phasis on group responsibility. The law of
crimes acquired a moral element, punishing
only those who were morally responsible for
the injurious act. The mental elements of crime
became of such great importance that mens rea
came to be regarded as fundamental to the
common law of crimes.
The purpose of vengeance or retribution
that was the basis of the ancient system of
criminal law has largely been replaced in mod-
ern criminal law by the purpose of preventing
undesirable conduct. Holmes wrote:
[T]here can be no case in which the law-maker
makes certain conduct criminal without his
thereby showing a wish and purpose to prevent
that conduct. Prevention would accordingly
seem to be the chief and only universal purpose
of punishment. The law threatens certain pains
if you do certain things, intending thereby to
give you a new motive for not doing them. If
you persist in doing them, it has to inflict the




In an effort to maintain the collective security,
society uses punishment to deter conduct it
views as undesirable. Thus, the most funda-
mental purpose of any criminal law is to induce
external conformity with its rules.2 8
However, this objective principle of punish-
ment generally has not weakened the principle
that conduct should not be criminally punished
unless individual responsibility and moral
blame can be ascribed-through a finding of
intent or mens rea. Professor Sayre noted the
fundamental nature of this concept, writing
that "it is of the very essence of our deep-
rooted notions of criminal liability that guilt be
26 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,SUpra note 10, at *160.
27 W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREArISE ON THE
LAW OF CRIMES. 64-65 (7th ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as CLARK & MARSHALL]; HOLMES, supra note 6,
at 46.
2CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 1-4;
HOLMtES, supra note 6, at 49.
personal and individual." 29 Even Holmes, one
of the chief exponents of the objective view of
criminal liability did not deny that an element
of moral blame is inherent in criminal liability.
"Such a denial would shock the moral sense of
any civilized community."3
It is the desire to prevent undesirable exter-
nal conduct, together with the desire to create
liability only concomitantly with moral blame
that has coalesced to form the basic formula
for modern criminal liability: the commission
of a prohibited act accompanied by a culpable
mental state.3' The first part of this formula is
reflected in the general societal rejection of
vicarious criminal liability. Criminal liability is
usually predicated on conduct of the individual
accused. 32 Where one person has committed
an injurious act, subjecting another person to
9 Sayre, CritninalResponsibilityfor the Acts of Another,
43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 717 (1930).
30 HOLINES, supra note 6, at 50. Some have even
argued that if personal guilt is not the basis of
criminal liability, the criminal process becones open
to the political abuses often seen in tyrannical re-
gimes. Professor Binavince, for example, expressed
the fear that criminal liability not based on personal
guilt, i.e. the growing doctrine of strict liability was
"posing a serious threat to the rational foundation of
criminal liability-the same threat that prevailed to
reduce penalty in Hitler's Germany into a morally
indifferent 'security measure,' and made millions of
innocent people 'criminals."' Binavince, supra note
6, at 1.
Aware of this potential, the drafters of the 1963
Draft Penal Code of West Germany included the
statement:
The draft is a criminal law based on guilt. This
means that the penalty, an institution which
contains a judgment of moral disvalue towards
human conduct and has always been fundamen-
tally so considered, may be imposed only if the
actor could be blamed for his act. To punish
without such reproach of blame would distort
the idea of penalty and transforms it into a
morally colorless neasure which could be
abused for political purposes.
Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches (SIGB) mit Begriindung,
96 (E. Binavince trans. 1962); Binavince, supra note
6, at 1 n.l.
Although there is little chance that the doctrine of
strict liability will lead by itself to the type of political
abuse described above, the doctrine is so contrary to
fundamental notions of criminal law that it should
not be adopted or continued without the most con-
vincing showing of necessity.
31 CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 262 n.6;
G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2d ed. 1961).
"See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 §4-1,
which makes a "voluntary act" a "material element of
every offense."
19781
criminal liability for the act is possible only if
the other person's act could be said .to have
caused the proscribed result.33 Generally,
therefore, criminal liability for the acts of an-
other may be imposed only where there has
been "authorization, procurement, incitation
or moral encouragement, or . . . knowledge
plus acquiescence." 3 4 In each of these situations
there has been conduct by the individual which
could be considered to have caused the ultimate
harmful act to another.
The second part of the formula, the require-
ment of a culpable mental state, stems from
the desire to impose criminal punishment only
where individual moral blame is attributable to
the actor. Under modern law, a culpable men-
tal state does not have to include a motive;
rather, a mental state is culpable if an actor has
sufficient knowledge of his surrounding cir-
cumstances to forsee that his act will, or is
likely to, have proscribed consequences.'
These requirements, and the underlying
concept of individual moral responsibility, have
found support in the expressions of the United
States Supreme Court. In Felton v. United
States, t' for example, the Court overturned the
conviction of defendants who had been
charged with violation of a tax on liquor be-
cause the evidence failed to show that the
violation was committed knowingly. Holding
that the defendants had acted in complete good
faith, which was "[a]ll that the law does require
' Sayre, supra note 29, at 702.
34 Id.
I HOLMES, supra note 6, at 53-54. See, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 §§4-3 to 4-7. Under
Illinois law, unless the statute defining the crime
specifically provides otherwise, a person must act
with intent, knowledge, or recklessness in order to
commit an offense. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 §4-3.
A person is considered to act recklessly when "he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that circumstances exist or that a result will fol-
low." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 4-6.
Similarly, the Final Draft of the Propo.ed Federal
Criminal Code, §§ 302(l)-(2), create a presumption
that an act must be done "willfully" in order for guilt
to attach. "Willfully" is defined to include conduct
done intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. U.S.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL DRAFT, §§ 302(1)(e),
302(2) (1971). The Working Papers of the Committee
indicate that recklessness requires a conscious dis-
regard of the likelihood that the actor is engaging in
prohibited conduct. U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
WORKING PAPERS 127 (1970).
36 96 U.S. 699 (1877).
or can require of them," Justice Field argued
that: "All punitive legislation contemplates
some relation between guilt and punishment.
To inflict the latter where the former does not
exist would shock the sense of justice of every-
one."
8 The principle that mens rea must accom-
pan)' an act to render it criminal was again
expressed in justice Jackson's opinion in Mori-
.sette v. United State.% :
39
The contention that an injury can amount to a
crime onls when inflicted b% intention is no
provincial or transient notion. It is as universal
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief
in fieedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil. A relation be-
tween some mental element and punishment for
a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's
familiar exculpatory "'But I didn't mean to," and
has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and
unfinished substitution of deterrence and refor-
mation in place of retaliation and vengeance as
the motivation for public prosecution .4
17 Id. at 703.
38 d. In Felton the defendants were convicted of
violating § 16 of 15 Stat. 131, Act of July 20, 1868.
which imposed a tax on distilled spirits. The de-
fendants were wine distillers who had installed a
new still which turned out to be too large for the
capacity of the lower wine receiver. Because of this
incapacity, a great deal of wine overflowed and had
to be recycled. This threw off their measuring de-
vices, with the result that some of the wine went
untaxed.
The Supreme Court overturned their conviction.
It decided that the essence of the charge aginst them
was that their receiver was of insufficient capacity.
However, the evidence failed to show that the de-
fendants knew of the problem until it was too late to
remedy it. The Court held that their onission could
not be criminal unless it was knowing and willful.
The Court also noted that while distillers could be
required to be familiar with the machinery of their
business, they did not have to be experienced ma-
chinists or familiar with everything required to ren-
der their machines perfect. It noted that in many
aspects the defendants necessarily had to rely on
others.
All that the law does require, or can require of
them, to avoid its penalties, is to use in good
faith the ordinary means-by the employment
of skilled artisans and conipetent inspectors-to
secure utensils and machbinery which will acconi-
plish the end desired.
96 U.S. at 703.
39 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
4 Id. at 250-51. See HOI.MES, supra note 6, at 3.
who also. noted the almost instinctive nature of the
feeling that blame could normally only be affixed,
noting that "even a dog distinguishes between being
COMMENTS (Vol. 69
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Despite these principles, some courts and
legislatures have eliminated the requirements
of mental intent and individual responsibility
for certain offenses which they feel require
different treatment. Generally, these offenses
are created by statute and have no counterpart
at common law. Most often they involve regu-
lation of business activities.
4
1
The argument supporting a departure from
the traditional principles of individual respon-
sibility and men.% rea is based on a distinction
between regulatory offenses and "true crimes."
A "true crime" or one which is mala in se, is
one which "involves moral delinquency or is
punishable by imprisonment or a serious pen-
alty."42 Almost all commentators have agreed
that these "true crimes" must be based on
personal moral guilt as shown by mens rea, and
that they cannot be committed vicariously. As
pointed out by Professor Sayre, none of the
objectives of criminal punishment, which he
identified as reformation of the offender and
prevention of future criminal violations on the
part of the offender and others, could be
served in "true crime" cases unless the defend-
ant had by his own conduct injured or menaced
social interests or had not "measured up to the
social standards imposed by the criminal law ."
4 3
However, where the criminal law is utilized
to enforce social regulations, some comnmenta-
tors and many courts44 have argued that differ-
ent considerations apply. Sayre, for example,
has argued that unlike true crimes, where pen-
alties have a strongly punitive objective, the
stumbled over and being kicked." However, both
Justice Jackson in Morrissette, and Holmes went on to
argue that this principle may not be applicable to
regulatory offenses. Morrissette, 342 U.S. at 254-63:
HOLMES, supra note 6, at 52. For further discussion
of "regulatory offenses" or those which are consid-
ered mala prohibita see text accompanying notes 43-
48 and 129-30 infra.
4' See text accompanying notes 43-48 infra. The
courts have generally construed crimes created by
statute as including an element of mens rea even if it
was not a specified element of the offense. Where
the offense was a codification of a common law
offense, it was generally assumed that the legislature
intended to include the mental element which was a
part of all common law offenses. As indicated in the
text, however, some courts have not followed this
general rule when construing regulatory offenses.
42 Sayre,.supra note 29, at 717.43 id. at 717-18.
14 E.g., Sayre, supra note 29, at 719-22; Lee, supra
note 2.
petty misdemeanors involved in regulatory of-
fenses do not involve questions of moral guilt.
4 "
These regulations, he maintains, are aimed
primarily at preventing direct and evident so-
cial injury. This purpose is hampered if it is
necessary to prove that a master had authorized
or had known about and acquiesced in the
illegal actions of his servant hefore he could be
held liable. 41 Since the penalties for such viola-
tions are normally small fines, the individual's
interest in avoiding conviction without proof
or personal guilt does not outweigh the societal
interest in the added deterrence brought about
by eliminating the need to prove intent or
knowledge .Y
Courts have not always been explicit in set-
ting forth the distinction between regulatory
crimes and other types of crimes, but as early
as the turn of the century, courts had clearly
accepted the doctrine of strict liability for reg-
ulatory crimes. In Overland Cotton Mill Co. v.
People,48 for example, the Supreme Court of
Colorado found the superintendent of the
Overland Cotton Mill Co. guilty of violations
of the child labor law, even though it found no
willful violations of the law. 49 The court argued
that because of his relationship with the com-
pany, the superintendent either knew or
should have known that he had hired a person
under the prohibited age. As the Court noted,
"[a]n agent of a corporation is presumed to
have that knowledge of its affairs particularly
under his control and management which, by
the exercise of due diligence, he would have
ascertained." 5° Since it was within the superin-
41 Sayre, supra note 29, at 719.
46 1d. at 719-20.47 1d. The Supreme Court made essentially the
same argument in Morrissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952), when it held that the crime of
stealing government property could not be commit-
ted without intent, but distinguished that crime from
regulatory offenses for which intent was unnecessary.
4s 32 Colo. 263, 75 P. 924 (1904).49 Id. at 267-68, 75 P. at 926.
50 Id. at 269, 75 P. at 926. Another officer of the
corporation, its treasurer, was also found guilty of
the offense by the trial court. The Colorado Supreme
Court noted that "[h]e certainly did all as an individ-
ual, or as an official of the company, to prevent the
law from being violated which could be required of
him." Id. at 270, 75 P. at 926. However, the court did
not have to answer the question of whether, despite
this diligence, he could be guilty of the offense, since
the treasurer had died between the time of his
conviction and the appeal.
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tendent's power to have prevented the employ-
ment, the court found him guilty of the viola-
tion.
The Washington Supreme Court was more
explicit in setting forth the distinction between
what it termed "police regulations" and other
crimes in State v. Burnam." It followed the
Colorado lead and extended the doctrine of
strict liability to situations where the defendant
was not the person who committed the inju-
rious act. The defendant was the secretary-
treasurer and manager of the Northwestern
Dairy Co., and he supervised the mixing of
milk. Two bottles of milk were taken from a
company milk wagon by state inspectors and
were shown to have been below standard. The
defendant was convicted. His conviction was
upheld by the Washington Supreme Court,
despite the fact that he testified that he had
not been present when the milk was mixed and
had left instructions to keep the milk up to
prescribed standards. The court held that the
statute was a police regulation enacted to pro-
tect the public health, and that its penalties
were to be imposed without regard to any
wrongful intention. The purpose of the statute,
it argued, was to "insure such diligence as will
render a violation of the law practically impos-
sible. 5 2 The court purported to follow the
Overland Cotton case, but it did not deal with
the fact that in Overland the defendant super-
visor had actually committed the illegal act by
hiring the minor, while in Burnam the defend-
ant's only connection with the illegal act was
responsibility within the company for supervis-
ing the mixing of milk. Thus, he was convicted
as much because of his position within the
company as because of any action that he had
taken personally.
The United State Supreme Court was first
presented with a statute creating criminal liabil-
ity without the requirement of mens rea in
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota .1 The de-
fendants in Shevlin-Carpenter had been con-
victed of willfully violating a state law by cutting
timber on state land without a valid permit.
The Minnesota statute in question imposed
treble damages for a willful violation and dou-
ble damages for a casual and involuntary viola-
tion. It further provided that cutting timber
s' 71 Wash. 199, 128 P. 218 (1912).
52 Id. at 200, 128 P. at 219.
218 U.S. 57 (1910).
without a valid permit was a felony, punishable
by a S1000 fine, two years imprisonment, or if
the violation was willful, both.
The defendants had held a valid permit for
cutting timber which had been extended, but
the) had continued to cut timber after the
permit had finally expired. The trial court
found them guilty of willful trespass, but the
finding of willfullness was overturned by the
Minnesota Supreme Court. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court found that the defendants had
believed in good faith that the permit had been
extended. Nevertheless, the defendants were
held liable under the Act.
Before the United States Supreme Court the
defendants argued that the statute violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment because it declared the act to be felony
but eliminated altogether the question of in-
tent. The defense, however, conceded nearly
its entire argument by admitting to the Court
that the rule requiring intent for criminal viola-
tions was subject to exceptions "'where so-
called criminal negligence supplies a place [.ic]
of criminal intent, or where, in a few instances,
the public welfare has made it necessary to
declare a crime, irrespective of the actor's in-
tent."'5 4 As the Court pointed out, such a
concession of exceptions destroyed the whole
rule." Any time the legislature eliminated the
requirement of intent, it presumably did so
because it felt it was required by the public
welfare. In this case the presumption was not
rebutted.
The defendants contended that by making
their act a crime without regard to intent, the
legislature had declared punishment for inno-
cent acts." They relied on a statement by
Justice Chase to the effect that the legislature
could not punish a citizen for commission of
an innocent act. 7 The Court rejected this ar-
gument, interpreting Justice Chase's statement
to mean that no punishment could be pre-
scribed for conduct not in violation of an exist-
ing law.58 As the Court pointed out, the de-
fendants' conduct had violated an existing law
and was therefore not innocent under the for-
mulation of Justice Chase."'
' Id. at 68.lId.





THEORY OF EXECUTIVE LIABILIT- -
Without mentioning Felton v. United States,i""
which had held that all the law could require
was the use of good faith efforts to avoid
violations,61 the Court in Shevlin-Carpenter re-
jected the contention that unintended actions,
or actions taken in good faith reliance on a
mistake of fact, could not constitutionally be
subjected to criminal penalties." - The Court
distinguished between those acts which were
mala prohibita and those which were mala in .63
stating that any general rule which held that all
crimes had to contain an element of intent
disregarded that distinction. 4 This distinction
between mala in se and mnala prohibita continues
to be used as support for distinguishing regu-
latory offenses which require no intent, from
crimes evolving at common law which require
an element of personal guilt. However, neither
the Court in Shevlin-Carpenter nor any later
courts have attempted to explain in what way
regtulatory offenses-those which are mala pro-
hibita-are -my different than those which
evolved at common law. The Court in Shevlin-
Carpenter accepted the defendant's concession
of exception-, to the general rule requiring
intent without even questioning why such ex-
ceptions are valid.
The Sttpreme Court has decided a series of
case, dealing with the Harrison Act'5 and the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act"; which
set the precedent for strict and vicarious liabil-
ity of corporate officers and employees. Al-
though the holdings in these decisions impose
strict liability on the corporate officer, some
language, particularly in United States %'. Park ,'
suggests the possibility of an alternative theory
of liability stressing the individual's power to
prevent violations from occurring and his duty
to implement measures designed to prevent
violations.
United State v. Johnson" was the first case in
-" 96 U.S. 699 (1877). See notes 37-39 supra and
accompanying text.
" Id.
12 218 U.S. at 70.
'4 Id. at 68.
4 Id.
'Hai rison Act. ch. 1, §- 2, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)
(repealed by At of Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1292
(1971)).
';f' 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970) (originally enacted as
Act of June 25. 1938, ch. 675, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040,
repealing Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906. ch.
3915, § 8, 34 Stat. 768).
-,7 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
'- 221 U.S. 488 (191 I).
which the Court indicated that a federal statute
might be construed to impose liability without
regard to intent. The case was brought on
appeal from an order of a district court quash-
ing an indictment charging the defendants with
violating section 2 of the Food and Drug Act."9
The indictment charged that the defendant
had delivered for shipment in interstate com-
merce packages and bottles of r dicine con-
taining statements that the medicine was effec-




The question presented to the Court was
whether the articles had been "misbranded"
within the meaning of the statute.,' Justice
Holmes construed the term as applying only to
statements which would be false or misleading
as to the identity of the article or drug, rather
than to statements regarding the qualities or
effects of the drug.72 The statute specified that
the term "misbranded" was to apply "to all
drugs, or articles of food .... the package or
label of which shall bear any statement, design,
or device regarding such article, or the ingre-
dients or substances contained therein which
shall be false or misleading in any particular."' 3
Justice Holmes argued that by including the
phrase "or the ingredients or substances con-
tained therein" after the word "article," the
Congress had evidenced an intent to limit the
term "article" to matters such as ingredients or
substances.74 Thus he concluded that the article
was not "misbranded" within the meaning of
the statute, since the label misstated its qualities
rather than its identity. In an attempt to further
justify this construction, Justice Holmes noted
that:
[A]lthough the indictment alleges willful fraud,
the shipment is punished by the statute if the
article is misbranded, and ... the article may be
misbranded without any conscious fraud at all.
It was natural enough to throw this risk on
shippers with regard to the identity of their
wares, but a very different and unlikely step to
" Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915 § 8, 34 Stat. 768,
770 (1906) (repealed by Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675,
§ 1, 52 Stat. 1040).
0 221 U.S. at 495.
1 Id.
,
2 ld. at 497.
r Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915 § 8, 34 Stat. 768,
770 (1906) (repealed by Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675,
§ 1,52 Stat. 1040).
4 221 U.S. at 497.
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make them answerable for their mistaken
praise. - '
Justice Holmes' conclusion that the offense of
misbranding could be committed without con-
scious fraud is somewhat puzzling since the
defendant in the case had knowledge of his
false statements, and the issue of whether
knowledge was a necessary element was not
before the Court. Surprisingly, however, this
unsupported statement, clearly dictum in the
case, was relied on by the Court in United States
v. Dotterweich ,_- a case which now plays a central
part in the Court's thinking about strict liabil-
ity.Y'
In United States v. Balint,"8 the Supreme Court
specifically construed a federal statute as im-
posing liability without regard to knowledge or
intent. The defendants were indicted tnder
the Harrison Act7 9 for selling certain narcotic
drugs "not in pursuance of any written order
on a form issued in blank for that purpose by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue."") The
defendants demurred to the indictment, argu-
ing that it had not charged them with knowl-
edge that what the) sold was an illegal drug.
The Court acknowledged that the common law
required scienter to be an element in every
crime, and that this requirement was generally
construed to be an element of statutory of-
fenses, even if they did not expressly provide
for scienter. The Court noted, however, that
there has been a modification of this view in
some situations. Many state statutes, it pointed
out, imposed absolute liability in cases "where
the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon
achievement of' some social betterment rather
than the punishment of the crimes as in cases
of maa in .se.""1 Revenue statutes also impose
73 Id. at 497-98.
71 320 U.S. at 281.
-, rhe Court's assertion in Johmon that Congress
would have been reasonable to make shippers an-
swerable for the mistaken identity of their drugs, but
not for mistakes relating to their qualities, is also
untenable. A misstatement as to a drug's qualities
could as easily mislead the layman as a misstatement
as to its identity, and requiring dealers in drugs to be
able to support any claims they make as to its qualities
does not seem unduly burdensome.
78 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
. Harrison Act. ch. 1, § 2, 38 Stat.. 785 (1914)
(repealed by Act of Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1292
(1971)).
" 258 U.S. at 251.
81 Id. at 252. The Court did not explain what the
purpose of punishing crimes which were nala in se
the burden of ascertaining the facts leading to
tax liability on the taxpayer, subject to possible
sanctions for failure to properly ascertain the
correct facts. In other areas, the policy of the
law may require punishment in cases of negli-
gence, in order to stimulate a standard of
care.82 In short, the Court argued that scienter
is not always required if the purpose of the
statute would be obstructed by such a require-
ment.
In considering the aim of the Harrison Act,
the Court noted that it was a taxing act, "with
the incidental purpose of minimizing the
spread of addiction to the use of poisonous
and demoralizing drugs."8 The Court then
noted that the emphasis of the statute was on
supervision of the drug business by the taxing
officers of the government, and that it used
the criminal penalty to secure recorded evi-
dence of drug transactions in order to tax and
restrain the traffic in the drugs. Thus, it con-
cluded:
Its manifest purpose is to require every person
dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether
that which he sells comes within the inhibition of
the statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug in
ignorance of its character, to penalize him.4
Like John.son, Balint has been interpreted by
later courts to support the imposition of strict
liability. But arguably, the Court seems merely
to have held that the Harrison Act imposed a
duty on all those who deal in drugs to find out
what substance they are dealing with. Those
who fail to determtine what they are dealing
with are subject to criminal penalties.
John.%on and Balint considered the question
of when an individual who had actually com-
mitted an allegedly illegal act could be held
strictly liable under the language of a federal
regulatory statute. In United State. v. Dotter-
weich ." the Court faced the question of how
and when strict liability might be imposed in
the corporate context. Specifically at issue was
was supposed to be. if not the achievement of some
social betterment. Nor did it explain why the pur-
poses of social betterment could be served only b)
the imposition of an absolute liability standard, while
whatever purposes which were to be accomplished
by punishing other crimes could be served despite
requiring scienter.
8 1 Id. at 252-53.
I' d. at 253.
Id. at 254.
' 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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whether the criminal provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 6 applied to
officers and employees of corporations, as well
as to the corporation itself.
8 7
Dotterweich was the president of Buffalo
Pharmacal Company. Both he and the com-
pany were charged with violating the Food and
Drug Act by shipping misbranded and adulter-
ated drugs into commerce. 8 The Buffalo Phar-
macal Company had purchased the drugs from
a wholesale manufacturer and had repacked
them for shipment under its own label. The
company then used the drugs to fill an order
placed by a physician in another state. Al-
though Dotterweich had no personal connec-
tion with the shipments, he was in general
charge of the corporation's business and had
given general instructions to fill orders received
from physicians.89 Although the jury acquitted
the company on all of the charges, Dotterweich
was convicted on all counts.90
Before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
Dotterweich argued that the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act was aimed at punishing
only the principal, or corporation, and not the
"innocent agent who in good faith and in
ignorance of the misbranding or adulteration
takes part in the interstate shipment of food or
drugs." 9' The Government, on the other hand,
maintained that the Act reached all who had
any part in the transaction. The court agreed
that such a construction was supportable by a
literal construction of the Act, but it argued
that there were "serious objections to so con-
struing it."
92
The court's first objection to the govern-
ment's construction stemmed from the fact that
86 Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970)).
7 320 U.S. at 279.
21 U.S.C. § 331(a) prohibits: "The introduction
or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce
of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulter-
ated or misbranded."
89 United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co.. 131
F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
10 The Supreme Court summarily rejected Dotter-
weich's argument that the jury could not find him
guilty and fail to convict the corporation. The Court
regarded as immaterial whether the jury's verdict
was the result of carelessness, compromise or a desire
to make the responsible individual suffer the penalty
instead of the corporation. "Juries may indulge in
precisely such vagaries." 320 U.S. at 279.
D1 131 F.2d at 502.
92 Id. at 503.
section 333(c)(2) 93 of the Act provided for ex-
culpation for a distributor who obtained a
guaranty from the manufacturer that the drug
was not misbranded or adulterated. The court
noted that the company was the only one likely
to obtain this guaranty, but under a literal
reading of the Act even a shipping clerk could
be held liable for violations if no guaranty were
obtained. The court maintained that the ques-
tion of the liability of someone in the position
of a clerk or other lower echelon employee
should not be made dependent on whether the
employer received a guaranty from the manu-
facturer. Since this would be the practical result
under the literal reading of the Act proposed
by the Government,9 4 the court argued that
congressional intent must have been to charge
only the "drug dealer, whether corporate or
individual,"95 with responsibility for introduc-
ing misbranded or adulterated drugs into com-
merce.9 6 Since the court could find no statutory
basis for distinguishing between corporate
agents of high and low rank, it concluded that
the criminal provisions of the Act could not be
applied to corporate employees, unless it were
determined that the individual and the corpo-
ration were essentially alter egos.97 Since it
could not conclude that Dotterweich was the
alter ego of the corporation, it reversed his
conviction.
The Supreme Court rejected this approach,
arguing that the Second Circuit construed the
Act too narrowly, and that it read too much
into the guaranty clause. The Court noted that
the Act had been amended in 1938 in an effort
to extend its control over food and drug com-
merce and to stiffen the penalties for disobedi-
ence. The Court went on to say:
The purposes of this legislation thus touch on
the lives and health of people which, in the
circumstances of modern industrialism, are
largely beyond self protection. Regard for these
purposes should infuse construction of this leg-
islation if it is to be treated as a working instru-
ment of government and not merely as a collec-
tion of English words .... The prosecution to
which Dotterweich was subjected is based on a
now familiar type of legislation whereby penal-
ties serve as effective means of regulation. Such
"' 21 U.S.C. § 333(c)(2) (1970).






legislation dispenses with the conventional re-
quirement of criminal conduct-awareness of
some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger
good it puts the burden of acting at hazard
upon a person otherwise innocent but standing
in a responsible relation to public danger.98
The Court cited United States v. Balints9 and
United States v. Johnson'0 0 for the proposition
that the Act was intended to impose liability on
shippers without regard to intent. However,
the Court did not consider the fact that the
only language in Johnson supporting the conclu-
sion that scienter was not required by the Act
was dictum running counter to the otherwise
accepted rule of statutory construction that
criminal statutes are to be construed to include
a requirement of scienter. And the Court ne-
glected to note that Balint had construed the
Harrison Act which was not necessarily analo-
gous to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. It
made no effort to consider whether the pur-
poses of the Act required it to be construed as
eliminating scienter. No section of the Act was
cited which would require such a result. In-
stead, the Court assumed that since this was a
regulatory act designed to protect the innocent
public, and since the Act had not specifically
included intent, that intent was not required.
It did not explain how regulatory acts differed
materially from criminal statutes designed to
protect the public.
Having concluded that the Act should be
construed to not require mens rea, the Court
considered whether the Act should apply to
corporate employees as well as to the corpora-
tion itself. The Court noted that the Act makes
"any person" who violates its provisions, includ-
ing a corporation, guilty of a misdemeanor. It
also noted that the only way the corporation
can act is through individuals acting on its
behalf, "[aind the historic conception of a 'mis-
demeanor' makes all those responsible for it
equally guilty."' 1 Thus, the Court maintained
98 320 U.S. at 280-81 (citations omitted).
99258 U.S. 250. See notes 79-88 supra and accom-
panying text.
100 221 U.S. 488. See notes 71-78 supra and accom-
panying text.
10' 320 U.S. at 28). The Court cited § 332 of the
Penal Code which is now embodied in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (1969): "Whoever commits an offense against
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as
a principal."
that Dotterweich was subject to the Act, unless
the Act could be read as creating an immunity
for individuals when the corporation violates
its provisions, even though "from the point of
view of action the individuals are the corpora-
tion.102
After considering the history of the Act, the
Court concluded that it should not be con-
strued as exempting individuals. When it was
first enacted in 1906, the Food and Drug Act
contained language expressly providing that
the acts of agents, officers, and employees were
deemed to be the acts of the corporation. These
words had been necessary in 1906 because of
the strict construction then given to such stat-
utes. The words were deleted in 1938, however,
because they were thought to be superfluous
under the doctrines of construction then pre-
vailing.10 3 Congress also changed other parts
of the statute in 1938 with the intention of
strengthening and extending the Act.0 4 From
this the Court concluded that Congress had
intended the criminal penalties of the Act to be
strong and far-reaching.
The Court next reviewed the holding of the
appellate court that a corporate officer could
not be charged under the Act unless he was
the "alter ego" of the corporation.' 05 The Court
could not believe that Congress intended such
a result.'08 It rejected the court of appeals'
argument that the Act was concerned with
placing the risks of the business on those in a
proprietary relationship with the drug (i.e., the
drug dealer), arguing that the Act was con-
cerned with the distribution of drugs, not with
the nature of proprietary relationships. It
noted that where a corporation was involved
the distribution of the drugs must be accom-
plished through the efforts of many individuals
standing in varying relationships with the cor-
poration itself. Some of those individuals would
be in a position to obtain a guaranty immuniz-
ing the whole shipment, while others would
not have that opportunity. The Court found
102 320 U.S. at 281.
's At the time the Food and Drug Act was origi-
nally passed, the courts were in disagreement as to
whether a corporation could be held criminally liable
for the acts of its agents. By the time of the 1938
amendments, it had been generally concluded that a
corporation could be liable for the acts of its agents.
10 320 U.S. at 282.
05 Id.
106 1d. at 283.
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no reason to assume, however, that all those
who could not obtain such a guaranty would
be exempt from the requirements of the Act
despite-their responsibility for the shipment.' 7
According to the Court, section 301 of the
Act imposes liability on the corporation, and
those "who aid and abet its commission are
equally guilty." 08 However, cutting back on
the full implication of these words, the Court
explained that "the offense is committed ...
by all those who ... have ... a responsible
share in the furtherance of the transaction."
The precise definition of which employees
stand in such a responsible relation to the
corporation was left to "the good sense of
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges,
and the ultimate judgment ofjuries."'10
The Court realized that in some cases hard-
ship might result from its interpretation, espe-
cially in light of the fact that no scienter was
required to violate the Act. However, it argued
that Congress had balanced the relative hard-
ship, and had "preferred to place it upon those
who have at least the opportunity of informing
themselves of the existence of conditions im-
posed for the protection of consumers before
sharing in illicit commerce, rather than ...
[on those] who are wholly helpless."'10
Although the limitation of liability to only
those with a responsible share in the transaction
narrows the range of potentially liable persons,
it is important to note that in Dotterweich the
Court went far beyond the language and hold-
ings of Johnson and Balint. It is one thing to
impose a duty on those who actually sell an
item to make every effort to determine whether
it is misbranded or adulterated, but it is a far
greater burden to require that everyone in a
"responsible relation" with a transaction must
insure that the article is not misbranded or
adulterated. The only relation which Dotter-
weich bore to the adulteration or misbranding
of the drugs in question was that he was the
president of the corporation that had distrib-
uted them. His only act in furtherance of the
transaction was to issue general instructions to
fill orders placed by physicians. Essentially, the
Court imposed on Dotterweich a duty to insure
that none of the of drugs distributed through
07 Id. at 283-84.
08 Id.
'09 Id. at 284-85.
10 Id. at 285.
his company had been adulterated or mis-
branded. He was required to have knowledge
not only of all of the circumstances surround-
ing his own actions, but also those of all of his
employees. Finally, there was no indication that
Dotterweich could have raised the defense that
he had used all reasonable efforts to prevent
violations.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy
argued that the statute did not give the re-
quired unequivocal warning to corporate offi-
cers that they were in the class of persons
subject to vicarious liability. Recitation of statu-
tory policy by the Court was not an adequate
substitute for the "requirement that the legisla-
ture specify with reasonable certainty those
individuals it desires to place under the inter-
dict of the Act.""'
Justice Murphy's criticism is well taken. Nei-
ther the statute itself nor the Court's interpre-
tation specifies with reasonable certainty those
who might be held liable if one of the corpora-
tion's shipments of food and drugs turns out
to be adulterated or misbranded. Normally, a
criminal statute which fails to give adequate
warning of what conduct is required and by
whom or which fails to prevent arbitrary appli-
cation by judges and juries is held to be uncon-
stitutionally vague." 2 Yet in Dotterweich, the
Court inexplicably and deliberately left the
statute vague. Further, the Court did not at-
tempt to account for the workings of the cor-
porate structure to determine who within that
structure could rationally be held liable and
under what circumstances.
The question of who in the corporation bears
a responsible relation to any particular transac-
tion was clarified in United States v. Park,ll3 the
Supreme Court's latest attempt to resolve these
issues. Elements of the Park decision suggest
how the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act might
be interpreted consistently with traditional no-
"' Id. at 286-87 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
'12 The principle that a statute must be sufficiently
precise to give warning of its requirements and to
prevent arbitrary judicial application was enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939), and has been reaffirmed on
several occasions. See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,
382 U.S. 399 (1966), where the Court held that a
Pennsylvania statute allowing the jury discretion to
assess costs to a defendant who, though acquitted,
was regarded as morally reprehensible, was unconsti-
tutionally vague.
"1 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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tions of individual responsibility without re-
moving the rigorous standards of care imposed
on the corporate management. The decision
also illustrates, however, some of the problems
inherent in the doctrine announced in Dotter-
welch.
Park, the president of Acme Markets, Inc.," 4
was convicted of causing the adulteration of
food which had traveled in interstate commerce
in violation of section 331(k) of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Park was
tried on the theory that he was a corporate
officer in a responsible relation to the transac-
tion and therefore liable under the Dotte-weich
rule. The Government charged that Park and
the company had received food following an
interstate shipment, and while holding it for
sale, had allowed it to be stored in a rat infested
warehouse owned by the company. At trial it
was shown that Park had previously been ad-
vised of the poor conditions at his Baltimore
and Philadelphia warehouses by the FDA.
When the conditions at the Baltimore ware-
house had not been eliminated by the time of a
second inspection by the FDA, Acme and Park
were charged with violations of the Act."' ;
Park testified during the trial that as presi-
dent of the company he was in a sense in
charge of all of its employees, but that under
the organizational structure, different phases
of the company's operation were assigned to
different individuals, who in turn had staff
and departments under their supervision."'
Park testified that upon receipt of the FDA's
notification he had conferred with the vice
president for legal affairs, who had informed
him that the Baltimore division vice president
was taking corrective action. He stated that he
did not feel that there was anything more he
could do about the situation. 1 8
The trial court instructed the jury that the
"' Acme Markets is a national food chain with
36,000 employees, 874 retail outlets, 12 general ware-
,houses and four special warehouses. Id. at 660.
15 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1970).
"6 421 U.S. at 660-62. Acme pled guilty to all
counts. Park pled not guilty but was convicted and
fined $50 for each of five counts. Id. at 660, 666.
Park indicated to the court of appeals that his chief
reason for appealing the conviction was the fact that
a second conviction would be a felony, punishable by
imprisonment up to three years. 499 F.2d 839, 840
n.2 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
"7421 U.S. at 663.
I18 ld. at 663-64.
sole question presented was whether the de-
fendant held a position of authority and re-
sponsibility in the business of Acme Markets,
and that he could be convicted despite the lack
of consciousness of wrongdoing and the lack
of any participation in the situation, if he
occupied a position of responsibility.' 9 Park's
conviction was reversed by the court of ap-
peals on the grounds that this jury instruction
had not correctly stated the law as reflected in
Dotterweich. The court construed the instruction
as saying that Park could be convicted merely
upon a showing that he was the president of
the company. The court argued that the in-
struction ignored the distinction between an
"awareness of wrongdoing" and "wrongful ac-
tion . "120 The court interpreted Dotterweich to
dispense with the need to show the element of
awareness, but not as dispensing with the re-
quirement that there be some showing that the
defendant had committed "wrongful action."
The court argued: "As a general proposition,
some act of commission or omission is an essen-
tial element of every crime. For an accused
individual to be convicted it must be proved
that he was in some way personally responsible
for the act constituting the criie."'' According
to the court, it was not enough to show merely
the defendant's relation to the corporation; his
relation to the criminal acts must also be shown.
The court feared that the trial court's instruc-
tion might have given the jury the erroneous
impression that Park could be found guilty
without a showing of wrongful action.'
22
The court's attempt to distinguish the con-
cepts of "awareness of wrongdoing" from
"wrongful action" illustrates how the Dotterz'eich
doctrine frustrates the concept of individual
responsibility. The appellate court in Park was
searching for a way to insure that more be
required for the imposition of criminal liability
than merely being the president of a corpora-
tion which was charged with a violation of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Yet its
distinction was clearly based on a misreading
of Dotterweich. Dotterweich started from the as-
sumption that the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act required no awareness of wrong-
doing, and held that those in a responsible
relation to the transaction were liable for the
"1d. at 665 n.9.
120 499 F.2d at 841.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 841-42.
COMMENTS (Vol. 69
THEORY OF EXECUTIVE LIABILITY
violations of the Act although not personally
involved in the offending transaction. Thus,
the express holding of Dotterweich negates any
requirement of individual wrongful action on
the part of the defendant.
The Supreme Court rejected the court of
appeals' interpretation of Dotterweich. It did not
agree that the district court was obliged to
instruct the jury that the Government had to
prove wrongful action on the part of the de-
fendant. Recognizing that the concept of hav-
ing a "responsible share" in a transaction, or
bearing a "responsible relation" to the violation
"imports some measure of blameworthiness,"
the Court held:
[T]he Government establishes a prima facie case
when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant
a finding by the trier of facts that the defendant
had, by reason of his position in the corporation,
responsibility and authority either to prevent in
the first instance, or promptly to correct, the
violation complained of, and that he failed to do
so. The failure thus to fullfil the duty imposed
bv the interaction of the corporate agent's au-
thority and the statute furnishes a sufficient
causal link. 123
Thus, the Court equated the concept of re-
sponsibility with that of power. One is in a
position of "responsibility" within the meaning
of Dotterweich if one occupies a position with
the power to either prevent or correct violations
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Throughout its opinion, the Court empha-
sized the concept of prevention in defining the
concept of responsibility. It argued that Dotter-
weidch and subsequent cases revealed that by
imposing liability on the corporate agent as
well as on the corporation itself, the Act "im-
poses not only a positive duty to seek out and
remedy violations when they occur, but also,
and primmily, a duty to implement measures that
will insure that violations do not occur."12 4 It fur-
ther argued that although the Act imposed the
"highest standard of foresight and vigilance
... the Act, in its criminal aspect, does not
require what is objectively impossible.'"r25 Ac-
cordingly, it reasoned that the Act would allow
the defense that the defandant was powerless
to prevent or correct the violation.'2 " There-
23 421 U.S. at 673-74.
124 Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
2-1 Id. at 673.
1211 Id.
fore, one of the elements to be proved by the
prosecution is the defendant's power to prevent
or correct the prohibited condition.'
27
By focusing on the power and the duty to
implement preventive and corrective measures,
the Court seems to suggest that the corporate
officer should not be held vicariously liable for
the violation itself. He should only be held
liable for failing to perform his duty of preven-
tion. The holding of the case, however,
stopped short of this conclusion. The jury
instruction which the Court ultimately upheld
included the statement that "[t]he main issue
for your determination is ... whether the
Defendant held a position of authority and
responsibility in the business of Acme Market.."'12
This instruction did not direct the jury to
inquire whether the defendant had instituted
any preventive or corrective measures; rather,
it told them that Park's guilt or innocence was
to be determined by his position within the
company. Nor was the jury directed to make a
realistic appraisal of what the officer could be
expected to know about the actions of those in
his employ. As a result, an absolute duty was
imposed on "responsible" corporate officers to
prevent or correct violations, regardless of any
requirement of knowledge, and regardless of
any steps they may have taken attempting to
assure compliance with the Act.
The Court's rationale in both Park and Dotter-
weich for imposing vicarious liability upon the
corporate officer is that such measures are
necessary to protect the public. It is argued
that if corporate officers are not also subject to
criminal penalties, corporations which might
profit from illicit business operations will have
no incentive to comply with the law. Imposition
of fines is felt to be inadequate deterrence
since the corporation can treat the fines much
like a license fee for conducting illicit opera-
tions. If it is more costly to prevent the violation
than to pay the fine, the corporation will simply
pay the fine. It is argued that by placing the
corporate officer where he could also be liable
for the corporation's conduct, new incentives
will be created for complying with the law.
While this justification suffices to explain why
criminal penalties must be imposed on corpo-
rate officers as well as on the corporation itself,
it does not explain why traditional principles
of criminal liability, which require, as a mini-
127 Id.
1281 Id. at 665 n.9 (emphasis added).
mum, knowledge and acquiescence or reckless
disregard must be ignored.
The difficulty the Court is having is caused
by its failure to consider carefully the context
in which a crime is committed. Instead it has
focused solely on the type of crime involved.
As noted earlier, the distinction between regu-
latory offenses and traditional crimes has been
a recurrent theme in the cases and commentar-
ies which have supported strict liability. They
have argued that regulatory offenses were de-
signed to protect the public from injury which
it was ill equipped to guard against without
such regulations. Thus, the public interest in
deterrence is especially high. Supporters of
strict liability argue that this interest in deter-
rence outweighs the individual defendant's in-
terest in avoiding conviction except with proof
of individual moral responsibility since regula-
tory offenses do not involve the questions of
moral guilt associated with aggressive crimes,
and since the penalties for these offenses are
very small.
Close examination of the distinction between
true crimes and regulatory offenses, however,
reveals that it cannot support strict liability,
especially in the corporate context found in
Dotterweich and Park. The distinction fails to
recognize that society's interest in preventing
traditional crimes, such as murder or robbery,
is just as great as its interest in preventing
violations of regulatory offenses. The innocent
public is in no better position to protect itself
from "street crime" than it is to protect itself
from regulatory offenses. Further, it is not
explained how the goal of preventing violations
is significantly furthered by a doctrine which
makes no attempt to determine the individual
responsible for the offense, but instead makes
an individual liable for the acts of the corpora-
tion. Finally, although the liability imposed is
often no more than a small fine, many regula-
tory offenses, including those under the Fed-
eral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, involve
potential imprisonment.
Thus, by concentrating simply on the types
of crimes involved, the courts have developed
an unnecessary doctrine which not only under-
mines the concept of individual responsibility
but is ill suited to accomplish the objectives of
the regulatory legislation. By imposing vague
and seemingly arbitrary standards of conduct,
enforced by criminal sanctions, the Court's
doctrine may well discourage responsible peo-
ple from taking jobs in highly regulated indus-
tries. The long run result may be less careful
operation of these businesses. Because the
Court's system of liability does not specifically
provide a defense for individual officers who
have taken reasonable steps to prevent viola-
tions from occurring, it fails to provide ade-
quate incentive to take these steps. Further,
because the standards imposed seem arbitrary
and impossible to fulfill, judges are likely to
refuse to use the sanction of imprisonment
and will probably impose very light fines, thus
reducing the effectiveness of the regulation
still further. Most importantly, the Court has
failed to provide any clear direction which
would guide corporate officials in their at-
tempts to comply with the law.
The distinction which needs to be made is
not between the types of crimes involved;
rather, the courts and legislatures must attempt
to deal with the peculiar problems created by
the corporate context in which these crimes
are committed. Many crimes are committed
directly by individuals outside the context of
normal lawful activities, and individual respon-
sibility in such cases is generally easy to deter-
mine. However, when offenses are committed
in the context of normal corporate activities,
individual responsibility is difficult to assign.
Violations by corporations are likely to occur
without the knowledge or direct participation
of "responsible" corporate officials. These offi-
cials will often be ignorant of the day-to-day
operations of their business, in which these
violations are likely to occur. Regulations which
impose criminal liability on these activities
should take this differing context into account
by insuring that those held criminally responsi-
ble for violations are likely to be aware of the
violations or conditions which would lead to a
violation and are in a position to prevent or
correct the situation. The Park decision, by
equating "responsible" officers with those who
had the power to prevent or correct violations,
articulated half of this goal. However, its doc-
trine will not insure that those held responsible
are those who would have knowledge of condi-
tions which would lead to a violation. By seek-
ing to incorporate both the requirements of
power to preyent violations and knowledge of
conditions which would lead to violations, a
more workable theory of criminal liability can
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be established to deal with offenses which take
place in the corporate setting. Such a test would
not need to dispense with established notions
of criminal responsibility and would more ef-
fectively assure adherence to the regulations.
High level corporate officers are essentially
managers. These people spend most of their
time on financial and budget matters and on
long range policy planning. 129 The operational
concerns of upper management are generally
confined to making policies and reviewing and
mediating claims and proposals arising from
middle and lower levels of the corporate struc-
ture, rather than with implementing the day-
to-day operation based on its policies. 30 Upper
management is thus unlikely to be familiar
with operations on the level that violations are
likely to occur.131
This problem is compounded by the fact
that officers at the top of the corporate hierar-
chy are likely to be cut off from the communi-
cations necessary to be aware of violations tak-
ing place. There is a natural tendency on the
part of subordinates not to report such "bad
news" on the theory that the people at the top
"simply don't want to hear about it.' 32 In fact,
in many cases popular belief about the law
actually discourages such reporting. As one
commentator pointed out:
[Tjhe top-level executive himself is afraid of legal
trouble, and the organization banks on the un-
written hope that "what he doesn't know can't
hurt him." ' 33
Clearly the law should not allow corporate
executives to hide behind a veil of claimed
ignorance. But neither should it make demands
upon the officers that are unrealistic in light of
their inevitable isolation from the mechanics of
daily operation of the business. What is needed
is a rational system of liability which takes
account of the corporate setting and uses it to
the advantage of both the corporation and the
law.
One commentator has suggested that when a
129 C. STONE, supra note 1, at 60 (1975).
130 Id.
'3' While this situation might be undesirable, the
way to deal with it is by legislation aimed directly at
the problem, rather than through strained interpre-
tations of the criminal law.
132 C. STONE, supra note 1, at 61.
'33 Id. at 62.
duty is imposed upon a corporation, the cor-
poration should be required to have an officer
in charge of compliance with that legally im-
posed duty. 13 4 The requirements necessary to
hold such positions would also be defined by
law. 35 This individual would be legally respon-
sible if corporate duties were not performed,
thus insuring that someone within the corpo-
ration would feel complete responsibility for
insuring that legally mandated tasks were per-
formed.136
It would be unrealistic, however, to expect
legislation which must be-general by its nature,
to be able to define the duties of such an
officer or officers with sufficient specificity to
be effective within the wide range of differing
corporate structures. Further, such a proposal
would cut deeply into the managerial preroga-
tive of determining the company's organiza-
tional structure. Having an outsider forced
upon them, whose loyalty is to the government
rather than to the company, might cause re-
sentment and a lack of cooperation among the
corporate officers. On the other hand, these
compliance officers could be looked upon as
convenient scapegoats by other officers within
the company who would feel that if anything
goes wrong it would be the compliance officer,
rather than themselves who would bear the
blame.
In order to be effective in regulating corpo-
rate activity, a theory of criminal responsibility
should seek to accomplish two goals. First, it
should insure that everyone involved with the
regulated activity is legally responsible for in-
suring that his activities do not contribute to
violations. Second, it should make sure that
some individuals can be singled out as being
responsible for any violation. A system which
accomplished only one of these goals would be
ineffective. If everyone is considered responsi-
ble for violations, but no individual can be
singled out as responsible for a given violation,
individuals would feel shielded by the group.
Criminal penalties would rarely be imposed on
every member of the group. To do so would
be unfair unless it were clear that every individ-
ual actually had a responsible share in the
violation. On the other hand, a system which
'




makes only certain individuals within the group
responsible would lead to irresponsibility by
the remainder of the group because they could
look on the designated individuals as conve-
nient scapegoats.
What is needed is a clear definition of the
duties of all corporate personnel, outlining
their role for insuring that the company com-
plies with the law. In this way individual re-
sponsibility can be incorporated into every case
where criminal liability is based upon corporate
acts. For the most part, however, this definition
must come from within the corporation itself.
The corporate management has the expertise
to insure that things get done within the cor-
poration. The law should utilize this expertise
to its advantage by requiring that the role of
each person within the corporation for insuring
compliance be defined by the management
itself. Either legislatively or judicially a general
rule should be established that when a duty is
imposed upon a business organization, the
president or chief executive officer is charged
with the duty of instituting the necessary sys-
tems within the company to insure compliance.
The president would be criminally liable only
to the extent that he had failed to establish a
system which could reasonably be expected to
produce the required result. 13 Other officers
and employees of the corporation would share
liability to the extent that their function within
the system established by the president was not
carried out.
A requirement of knowledge and individual
responsibility would be built into such a system,
since it would take into account what each
individual could be expected to know and do.
It would impose responsibility on each individ-
ual within the group, but would insure that
responsibility for violations could be assigned
to specific individuals since their duties would
be clearly defined. The president could not be
held liable for violations of which he was not
aware except to the extent that the system he
13- Reasonableness in each case would be deter-
mined according to the facts at hand. However, like
any other expert, the executive's standard of care
would be measured against others with his expertise.
Several factors could help determine if a plan was
reasonably designed to produce the required result,
including the presence or absence of built in feedback
mechanisms, and the efforts by top management to
convince the lower levels of the sincerity of their
concern.
established did not have reasonable means of
feedback communication. The president's lia-
bility would be determined by looking to what-
ever system he had established to deal with the
situation. Merely giving instructions to take
preventive or corrective measures, without any
follow-up, would not be considered reasonable
measures. Perhaps the chief reason why Park
was convicted, and why the Court ultimately
had few qualms about holding him liable, was
that he simply had not gone far enough to
correct violations which had been brought to
his attention. He made no efforts to insure
that his instructions were carried out. This
simply was not reasonable conduct. Thus, in
addition to mechanisms for feedback, it would
be essential that the corporate officer take
action based upon the knowledge provided by
the systen. Similarly, each employee's liability
would be determined by the extent to which he
had completed his clearly defined task within
the system .
3 8
Many firms have already tmndertaken similar
measures in response to increasingly tough
enforcement of the antitrust laws. For example.
some firms have begun to educate their sales
personnel about the requirements of the anti-
trust laws and have issued strict directives re-
quiring compliance. Some have held periodic
meetings to discuss and evaluate the effective-
ness of compliance methods.'35 This type of
131 By emphasizing the duty to "implement mea-
sures that will insure that violations do not oc-
cur," 421 U.S. 658, 672, the Court in Park essentially
suggested the proposal just outlined. But Park weak-
ened any incentive for creating such systematic ef-
forts by failing to give assurance that criminal liability
would not be imposed if violations occurred despite
bona fide efforts to prevent them. Further, by hold-
ing Park liable because of his position within the
company, the Court repudiated such an interpreta-
tion.
13' As an example, executives of firms making
paper labels for bottles and cans who were convicted
of antitrust violations in 1974 returned to court on
the anniversary of their decree and reported on
their activities to discourage price fixing within their
industry. What was reported consisted primaril) of
efforts to educate sales personnel about the require-
ments of the law and strict instructions as to how
each was to comply. Employees of the H. S. Crocker
Company, for instance, were given copies of the
consent decree entered in the case, and were re-
quired to sign statements that they had read it. The
sales personnel of Crocker were instructed not to
discuss prices with competitors. Meetings were held
with the employees about the company's antitrust
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systematic effort is undoubtedly necessary to
insure that regulations are both understood
and complied with in the corporate setting.
By clearly defining those with responsibility
policies. At Diamond-International Company similar
efforts have been made, including periodic meetings
to discuss and evaluate the effectiveness of the com-
pliance efforts. BOYD CURRENT SUMMARY 19 (Dec.
22, 1976).
for insuring that corporate duties are carried
out and imposing upon them the duty of decid-
ing how the duties will be carried out, the
business structure would be utilized in favor of
the law, rather than at cross purposes with it.
It would, most importantly, eliminate the ne-
cessity of abrogating traditional requirements
of the criminal law.
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